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ExECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2009, South American military spending reached a total of
$51.8 billion, a fifty percent increased from 2000
expenditures.
The five-year moving average of arms
transfers to South America was 150 percent higher from
2005 to 2009 than figures for 2000 to 2004. 1 These figures
and others have led some observers to conclude that Latin
America is engaged in an arms race.
Other reasons,
however, account for Latin America's large military
expenditure. Among them:

• Several countries have undertaken long-prolonged
•
•

modernization efforts, recently made possible by six
years of consistent regional growth. 2
A generational shift is at hand.
Armed Forces are
beginning to shed the stigma and association with past
dictatorial regimes. 3
Countries are pursuing specific individual strategies,
rather than reacting to purchases made by neighbors. For
example, Brazil wants to attain greater control of its
Amazon rainforests and offshore territories, Colombia's
spending demonstrates a response to internal threats, and
Chile is continuing a modernization process begun in the
1990s.4
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Concerns remain, however:
Venezuela continues to
demonstrate poor democratic governance and a lack of
transparency; neighbor-state relations between Colombia and
Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, must
all continue to be monitored; and Brazil's military purchases,
although legitimate, will likely result in a large accumulation
of eqnipment. 5
These concerns can be best addressed by strengthening and
garnering greater participation in transparent procurement
mechanisms. 6 The United States can do its part by
supporting Latin American efforts to embrace the
transparency process.

5

6

Ibid., Guevara, Jiiigo, Pg. 22
Ibid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. I 8 and I 9
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THE ONGOING QUESTION

Since the Central American wars of the 1970s and 1980s,
Oscar Arias Sanchez, Costa Rica's two-time president and
1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner, has closely monitored arms
acquisitions and military expenditure in Latin America. In
1997 he advocated for an International Code of Conduct on
Arms Transfers, designed to place specific restrictions on
arms-producing countries. 7 In September of 2009, he
regretfully informed the United Nations General Assembly
that Latin America was spending approximately "165 million
dollars a day on weapons and soldiers." 8 And in May of
2010, he asserted that, "Despite the euphemisms that are
used to conceal it, Latin America has begun a new arms race,
fueled by ideological debates and the institutional weakness
of our democracies."9
These latest comments have understandably caused concern,
and even some confusion, amongst policy circles. After all,
Arias' comments came just weeks after those of Dr. Frank 0.
Mora, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, who said, "I do not believe that
there is an arms race brewing ... the region has made strides
in increasing transparency and creating mechanisms of
defense and security cooperation through the development of
regional institutions..." 10 Prior to this, he had explained that
Latin American arms purchases were ''most likely aimed at
7

Whitney, Joel, "Oscar Arias Sanchez," Guemica, May 2005,
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modernizing military equipment that [hadn't] been upgraded
over the past 30 or 40 years." 11
'Who then, is correct?' one is left asking. Is an arms race
actually occurring? And if not, what have been the reasons
for increased military spending in the region? In May of
2008, The Economist also attributed the region's military
spending to modernization, to "more normal relations
between civilian governments and their armies," and to
commodity-driven economic growth. 12 Others claimed that,
"very real security concerns [were] being neglected," and
that therefore new spending attempted to address them. 13
However, do these various explanations hold true today?
Furthermore, if countries are indeed modernizing their
national militaries, "When do those legitimate modernization
concerns end and when does the acquisition process
constitute a threat?" one observer has asked. 14
In an attempt to answer these lingering questions, regional

experts gathered on June 3rd, 2010, at a Brookings Institution
and Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) cohosted event entitled, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere?
Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military
Expenditures in South America." Many of their responses
are highlighted within this report.
11
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CONCERNING FIGURES

According to Mark Bromley, a researcher from Sweden's
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
South American military spending reached $51.8 billion in
2009. "This was a 7.6 percent increase on the 2008 figure
and a 50 percent rise on the 2000 amount," he says. "The
rate of increase that we've seen over the past decade is
almost double what it was in the previous ten years," he
continues, with Brazil,
Latin American military expenditure 1988-2009
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Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador and Uruguay standing
out as the six biggest spenders. 15 (See Appendices I and II
for individual country expenditure and major arms
suppliers). From 2003 to 2008 alone, reports London's
International Institute for Strategic Studies (llSS~, Latin
America's overall military spending rose 91 percent. 6

15
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As for arms imports, Bromley says, "Transfers of arms to
South America were 150 percent higher in the period 2005 to
2009 than they were in 2000 to 2004," according to a fiveyear moving average. "This rise in transfers," he says,
"exceeds the rise in transfers to Southeast Asia and North
Africa, two other areas where the specter of potential arms
races has been raised in recent years. In Southeast Asia,
arms imports have risen by nearly 100 percent, while m
North Africa, transfers have gone up by 60 percent."17
MODERNIZATION,
COMPARISONS

ECONOMIC

GROWTH,

AND

GLOBAL

During the aforementioned Brookings Institution/CHDS
event, Ifugo Guevara from Mexico's Colectivo de Anii.lisis
para Ia Seguridad con Democracia (CASEDE) explained
that Latin American countries are indeed continuing to
modernize their militaries, and that the high costs described
above are simply inherent to the process. For example,
"several countries are appra1smg their front-line
conventional infantries" and replacing inventories from the
1970s and 1990s, he said. "[And] conventional weapons,"
which he described as jets, tanks, armor, artillery,
submarines, and surface ships, "are considerably expensive,
especially the new generation of networked fighting
machines." Therefore the high sums of $50 billion and
beyond can be attributed to modernization costs, rather than
an arms race. Furthermore, an arms race requires an "actionreaction mechanism" that is largely absent in Latin America.
In other words, countries would need to be continuously
striving to both match and then significantly surpass the
spending and acquisitions of their neighbors, and he does not
see this happening. 18
17
Bromley, Mark, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing !he Trends
and hnplicationB of Military Expenditures in Soolh America," Brookings
Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pg. 16
18
Ibid, Guevara, Ifiigo, Pgs. 21 and 22
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At the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium in
Miami, Marcos Robledo from Chile’s Fundación Dialoga ,
affirmed that Latin America’s recent economic success has
provided countries with the means to fund modernization
aspirations and new defense strategies. Prior to the U.S.
financial crisis, he says, the region experienced six years of
consistent growth, assisted strongly by nearly a decade of
high commodity prices. This granted Venezuela oilgenerated growth despite economic mismanagement, and
hastened Brazil’s long-term trek to global stardom. As for
Chile, it has managed to maintain 5 percent GDP growth for
a total of twenty years.19
Beyond these new funding abilities, however, Ray Walser of
the Heritage Foundation is wary to dub new spending and
acquisitions as an arms race, primarily because “the numbers
on a global scale don’t really tend to add up.” For example,
when Brazil’s arms expenditures are placed within the global
context, it “only makes the top fifteen nations,” he says; and
on a per capita basis, it ranks 88th.20 Robledo makes a
similar global comparison, explaining that in 2007, Latin
American resources dedicated to military expenditure were
equivalent to lower than 1.5 percent of the region’s overall
GDP, as opposed to expenditure in the Middle East/North
Africa and the United States, which ran at approximately 5
percent and just over 4.5 percent, respectively. While his
data does also show that Colombian and Chilean expenditure
during the same year ran at roughly 4 percent and 3.5 percent
of GDP, respectively, such figures can be attributed to the

19

Robledo, Marcos, “The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,” Power
Point presentation, Slide 18, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium,
Miami, Florida, May 25th – 26th, 2010
20
Walser, Ray, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 47 and 48
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fact that both countries incorporate their national police
forces into their military budgets, Guevara has explained. 21
Therefore, neither Walser nor Robledo perceive an
abnormality in Latin American defense spending vis-a-vis
the rest of the world. And because Robledo believes the
region's communication- i.e. transparency mechanisms- on
individual country defense plans has improved, he finds that
there is "no evidence of [a] regional rearmament; military
acquisitions [have] related to different country rationale, not
regional.',n
Overall, Ray Walser attributes spending and acquisitions to a
changing Latin America (encompassing both the
modernization and economic developments described above,
we can assume), less U.S. engagement and influence, and
finally, to ideology and leadership approach. However, he
also reaffirms Robledo's assertion: that beyond these general
explanations, each country is following an independent,
individuallogic.23
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY RATIONALE: BRAZIL, COLOMBIA,
AND CHILE

Brazil has offered several explanations for its own
military ambitions. First and foremost, it intends to protect
the reaches of its huge Amazon rainforests. Therefore, "the
number of border posts where troops will be stationed will
be increased," reports The Economist, "and still more
soldiers will be trained in the art of jungle warfare." The
BRAZIL:

21

Robledo, Marcos, "The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective," Power
Point presentation, Slides 12, and 13, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security
Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25"'- 26", 2010; and consultations with lfiigo
Guevara, October 2010
22
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23
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Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings Institution
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, TI'Slll!cript Pgs. 49 and SO
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next priority is to guard the country's prized offshore oil
finds, made possible by the purchase of four Sco:rpene
submarines from France, and by plans to develop a nuclear
attack submarine.24 And on September 9th, 2010, Deputy
Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Gerson
Menandro Garcia de Freitas, indicated that another "strategic
purpose" of the Brazilian army was to safeguard the country
during the upcoming FIFA World Cup in 2014, and the
Olympic Games in 2016. 25
The Economist has questioned the necessity of some of these

measures, but not because it opposes Brazilian military
modernization. In fact, it says that Brazil's army "has
changed surprisingly little since it ran the country in a
dictatorship lasting from 1964 to 1985. . . [And] with
democracy firmly established, it needs to find a new job".
Rather, the magazine states that Brazil's anny would be put
to better use by continuing to pursue international
peacekeeping missions. This, too, would facilitate
modernization, they say, impJtng that it would be a
responsible method of doing so. 2
Finally, it has been suggested that Brazil's peacekeeping
forces are sent across the world as a means to further the
country's image. 27 Ray Walser would probably agree with
this, as he has suggested that Brazil might be pursuing each
of its military strategies - including plans to address local
violence and transnational organized crime threats - to gain
"greater weight to carry to the international table. "28
24

Brands, Hal, "Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy," Pg. 13, Strategic
Studies Institute, August2010
""What is Brazil's Army For?" The Economis~ September 9"', 2010
26
lbid; See also, "Policy, Not Altruism: How Global AmbitionB are Helping to
Modernize the Army," The Economist, September 23"', 2010
27
Ibid
28
Walser, Ray, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings Institution
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, TI'lllll!cript Pgs. 53 and 54
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Walser explains that Colombia's military
doctrine and acquisition system were forged by its response
to domestic threats of the two main guerrilla groups - the
FARC and ELN - as well as paramilitaries and drugtrafficking cartels. 29 This type of military buildup was
widely supported by society - says Adam Isacson, a Senior
Associate for the Washington Office for Latin America- and
ultimately led to the country's current defense budget, which
is three times that of 2000. More recently, however,
Colombia has cast concerned eyes on neighboring
Venezuela, explains Isacson.
"Chavez's rhetoric and
purchases have had an impact on [Colombian] debate ... in
the media and in official circles, you do increasingly hear
talk about a possible threat from Venezuela against which
Colombia must prepare."3 For example, after Venezuela
attained twenty-four Sukhoi fighters, Colombia's Air Force
wished to respond by obtaining a set ofF -16s, says Guevara;
yet in the end, the Colombian government decided instead to
purchase 13 Kfu fighter jets, to update the 11 Kfrr fighters
already owned (which dated back to the 1980s), and to
employ them in the fight against insurgencies. 31
COLOMBIA:

°

CHILE: Julio Soto, a professor at the National Academy of
Political and Strategic Studies in Santiago, says his country's
defense policy consists of two elements: "national security
achieved mainly by deterrence and international cooperation.
Nevertheless, "he continues, ''we think that the core of our
defense is based on the modernization processes of our
defense institutions (in effect since the 1990s); second, in
regional cooperation on defense and security issues; and
finally, in our contributions to the international environment
of peace and security." 32
29

lbid., Pg. 51
Ibid., lsacson, Adam, Pgs. 62 and 66
31
Consultation with liligo Guevara, October 2010
Solo, Julio, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and
Implications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings Institution
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Tralll!cript Pgs. 74 and 75
10
30

At the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium,
Robledo explained that Chile's defense spending has
remained consistent and level from 1990 to 2008; that its
long-term military expenditure has actually decreased from
the 1970s onward; that its active military has consistently
shrunk since 1990; and fmally, that within the past nine
years, many armed forces materials have been replaced
rather than increased. 33
ARIAS SANCHEZ REVISITED

All of these general and country-specific explanations seem
to call Arias' arms race concerns into question. Also
questionable is the following assertion he made before the
United Nations in 2009: "Jn Latin America, and in a
substantial portion of the developing world, armies have not
served any purpose [other] than to carry out a coup d'etat. " 34
Within only months of his statement, Latin American
militaries were utilized to play key roles in disaster-relief
efforts. For example, in the wake of Chile's 8.8-magnitude
earthquake, 10,000 troops were deployed to successfully
quell disorder and wide~read looting in the country's BioAnd in the aftermath of Haiti's
Bio and Maule regions.
massive earthquake, "U.S., Colombian, and Brazilian
[military] personnel - in conjunction with many others worked side-by-side to deliver life-saving relief to the
Haitian people," Mr. Mora has explained ?6

33

Robledo, Marcos, ..The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective," Power

Point presentation, Slides 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, and26, 2010 WestemHe:misphere
Security Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25"- 26", 20 I 0
34
Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Squander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth
Session of the United Nations Goooral Asserchly: General Debate, New Y ark,
September 24", 2009
35
"Counting the Cost; Chile's Earthquake," The Economist, March 6"', 2010
36
Mara, Frank 0., "The Top 7 Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the
Ameticas," Pg. 7, University of Miami, April29"', 2010
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Yet one of the primary drivers behind most of Arias'
statements is the belief that the region's resources would be
put to better use if military spending was re-directed towards
poverty alleviation, education and vaccination provision,
environmental rehabilitation, etc., particularly in a region
where he says one-third of population faces poverty. 37 And
on this front, he has recently received strong support from
Dr. Kevin Casas-Zamora, a Brookings Institution fellow and
former Vice President of Costa Rica, who says that Latin
An3erica' s current levels of military expenditure are
detrimental to the region's economic development. It may
not be apparent when we compare Latin An3erica's military
expenditure to that of the rest of the world; but when other
comparisons are made, he says, such as military spending to
levels of taxation, and military spending to investment in
education, the story is different. "It turns out that military
expenditure in South An3erica is a higher proportion of tax
revenue and education expenditure than anywhere else in the
world," he says, "with the predictable exception of North
Africa and the Middle East. Even sub-Saharan Africa fares
better when we place military spending under this light.
Simply put, in the low taxation context that is pervasive in
Latin An3erica, military expenditure does compete with the
scarce resources for development." Economics laureate
Lawrence Kline has corroborated these findings,
demonstrating that reductions in Guatemalan military
expenditure from 1968 to 1994 resulted in not only greater
overall GDP, but also improved household consumption. 38
Finally, to gain even greater insight into both, Arias'
comments and the overall expenditures phenomenon at large,
37

Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Squander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth
Session of the United Nations Geoersl Asserobly: Geoerol Debate, New York,
Septerober 24", 2009
38
Casas-Zamora, Kevin, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the

Treods and hnplications of Military Exponditu:res in South America," Brookings
Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transeript Pgs. 101
and 102
12

Arias' individual experience and generation must be
juxtaposed with that of the shift in perception that has
recently occurred in Latin America. For example, Arias
acted as the key negotiator in Central America's 1987 peace
accord, and his generation was witness to decades of South
American military dictatorships. Yet increases in regional
military expenditure today, says Chilean academic and
former ambassador Boris Yopo, have occurred "above all,
[because Latin America] is beginning to shed the stigma and
association of the Armed Forces with past dictatorial
regimes, causing policy and societal constraints to disappear,
and providing these [military] institutions with the necess~
resources to carry out the duties of national defense." 9
Bearing these changes in mind, statements by Arias appear
to demonstrate a clash between his own historical
perspective, and that of a new Latin American outlook and
landscape.
AREAS TO MONITOR

Regardless of this paradigm shift, and the reassuring
explanations offered above, Latin America contains its own
set of "red flags." Venezuela has displayed questionable
governance and military strategy; individual country security
considerations demonstrate a vulnerability to old competition
and disputes between neighbors; and Brazilian
modernization efforts and plans, while legitimate, hold the
long-term potential to amass large amounts of military
equipment. While none of these areas currently portend a
Latin American arms race, they do hold the potential for one,
I:iiigo Guevara has warned, and should therefore be closely
monitored. 40
39

Yopo, Boris, ..t,Carrera Armamentista en la Regi6n?" La Tercera, November

2"', 2009, <http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895 197084 9.shtml>, accessed
October 8"', 2010
40
Gu<ovara, lfiigo, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends
and hnplications of Military Expenditures in South America," Brookings
hlstitution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pg. 22
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Like the country plans mentioned prior,
Venezuelan military strategy follows its own individual
country ratiouale. It is acquiring arms, says Walser, because
of Hugo Chavez's ideology, his approach to governance, and
his perceived threat of a U.S. invasion. 41 Robledo sees this
last area as an "explicit anti-U.S./Colombia strategic
narrative," including Colombia because of Mr. Chavez's
claims that a U.S. invasion could come through this
. country. 42
nm"ghbonng
VENEZUELA:

However, additional factors are at work, explains The
Economist; purchases made in 2005-2008 - twenty-four
Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft, 100,000 Kalashnikov assault
rifles, and fifty military helicopters from Russia - "may have
been presented as a show of strength to the imperialists in
Washington, but it was also designed to shore up support
from the generals at home." Mr. Chavez wants to maintain
support from the institution where he has historical ties, the
magazine conveys. 43
What concerns Marcos Robledo most about Venezuela is its
poor ranking in the area of democratic governance and its
lack of transparency, making it what he calls the region's
"most complex case."44 (Indeed, as Arias once stated, ''The
combination of strong armies with weak democracies has
proved to be harmful in every comer of the planet"). 45 Some
41

lbid., Walser, Ray, Pgs. 56 and 61
Robledo, Marcos, ..The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,•• Power
Point presentation, Slide 17, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium,
Miemi, Florida, May 25th- 26", 2010
43
"Speak Fraternally But Carry a Stick; South Americao Defense," The
Economist, May 31", 2008
44
Robledo, Marcos, ..The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,•• Power
Point presentation, Slide 17, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium,
Miami, Florida, May 25th - 26"', 2010
45
Arias Sanchez, Oscar, "Let Us Not Squander the Miracle of Life," Sixty-fourth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly: General Debate, New York,
September 24"', 2009
42
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assert that Chavez is using weapons as "instruments of social
control.'M Others, such as former legislator Teodoro
Petkoff, of Venezuela's newspaper Tal Cual, go further,
saying, "This isn't a conventional dictatorship... It's an
authoritarian government with a strong military element that
doesn't hide its intentions to control society behind a
democratic favade." 47
As for transparency, many defense purchases are indeed
known. "Since 2006," says Guevara, ''the Venezuelan armed
forces have acquired 2 dozen Sukhoi fighter jets that have
replaced its aging inventory of F-5 and Mirage 50s; [they
have] acquired 18 Chinese armed jet trainers that effectively
attend a requirement first laid out by their Air Force in the
early 1980s; 10 combat helicopters; 8 patrol vessels; and a
couple of hundred short-range air defense missiles." Other
purchases - which he lists as tanks, armor, artillery,
submarines, strategic transport aircraft, tankers, additional
advance jet fighters, and strategic air defense systems - have
been discussed, but not yet authenticated. Still, despite
"overexcitement, exaggeration, and rhetoric," he says, "most
of Venezuela's conventional acquisitions [have] remained
under normal historical levels and are replacing or restoring,
rather than increasing, combat capabilities."
The greatest concern is that there might possibly be a weekly
or bi-weekly flight traversing between Caracas and Tehran,
carrying unidentified materials. However, no one is quite
sure whether this is happening or not. 48 Similarly, former
U.S. ambassador Roger Noriega has recently claimed that
46

Walser, Ray, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Tronds and
Implications of Military Expenditures in South Ametica," Brookings Institution
Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3"', 2010, Transcript Pgs. 56
47
"Feeling the Heat; Hugo Chavez's Venezuela," The Economis~ May 15"', 2010
"Guevara, liligo, "An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends
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36
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Chavez is carrying out a "secret nuclear program;" that Iran
is helping Venezuela mine its uranium, and that Venezuela is
providing Iran access to the international financial sector.
Both activities run contr~ to mandates made by the U.N.
Security Council, he says. 4
NEIGHBOR STATES: Beyond Venezuela itself exist the
sometimes-reactive relationships between Colombia and
Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay,
among other potential border conflicts.

Colombia contemplated buying tanks in response to
Venezuelan purchase proposals (described above) - a move
that would have indeed been indicative of an arms race - but
for the time being at least, wisely decided against it. Peru,
cognizant of Chilean military capacity, nearly did likewise.
After all, "Chile has just gone through a long-term cycle of
defense upgrade that has seen its equipment and its forces
updated to the highest standards in its history," says
Guevara. Peru halted its planned purchases, however, and
instead began to advocate for preventative safeguards against
potential arms races. And "Chile has shown restraint," says
Guevara, "by acquiring secondhand equipment from NATO
sources rather than buying brand new weapons and further
escalating the imbalance." And finally, while BolivianRussian arms negotiations initially caused a panic in
Paraguay, fears subsided when Bolivia reassured its neighbor
and strengthened its own transparency efforts. 50
BRAZIL REVISITED: Brazil accounts for approximately half
of Latin America's overall defense spending, says Guevara,
49
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gram?page=O,O>, accessed October 24", 2010
50
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making steady observation of Brazilian military activity a
long-term requisite. While there appears no reason to sound
any alarms, Brazil is clearly the largest actor in the region.
"[It] is acquiring a new generation of jet fighters, armor,
submarines, destroyers, frigates, helicopters, along with the
capabilities to indigenously produce, service, and support
them," Guevara explains; "We will [therefore] have to wait
to see what effects this or its longer term ambitions of
fielding a two-carrier Navy, a space-based presence, and a
cyber warfare capability produces in the region." 51
TRANSPARENCY MECHANISMS, UNASUR, AND U.S./LATIN
AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP

Despite the more concerning areas described above, "States
in South America, as in all parts of the world, have the
legitimate right to defend themselves and extend control over
their territory," says Mark Bromley. ''Nonetheless," he
continues, "as events in South America have demonstrated in
recent years, certain acquisitions have the potential to alter
the balance of power in the region and, if not carried out in
an open and accountable way, can provoke mistrust and
instability. What this points to is the need for transparent
procurement mechanisms that allow for both governments in
the region and the wider public to see what is being
purchased and why." 52
Others might suggest putting pressure on arms producers to
decrease military expenditures, but it probably won't work,
says Adam Isacson, primarily because there are so many
producers. "Ten years ago, fifteen years ago," he says, ''the
United States was not only the largest seller of weapons to
the region, it accounted for more than half of sales." It now
accounts for only a third. The U.S. can do its part, he says,
51

52
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by abstaining from sales that demonstrate fiscal
irresponsibility, or sales that look likely to fuel regional
tensions; but it, too, should "[make] transparency a key
foreign policy goal," he says, seconding Bromley's
conclusion. 53
To achieve greater hemispheric participation in transparency
mechanisms, however, governments will have to navigate
the three independently operating regional and international
systems:
1. The United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms. "[It] was established in 1991," explains
Bromley, "and creates a political commitment for
all states in the world to share information on
their imports, exports, and holdings of major
conventional weapons systems. Now, every state
in South America has submitted information to
the UN Register on at least one occasion over the
last 10 years," he continues. "However, the
overall number of submissions has fallen in
recent years to about half of what it was at the
beginning of the 2000s. Meanwhile, only two
states in the region - Brazil and Chile - have
consistently submitted information to the UN
Register since 1998."54
2. Organization of American States' Transparency
Convention (the lnter-American Convention on
Transparency
in
Conventional
Weapons
Acquisitions), explains Bromley, which although
established as early as 1999, has only been signed
by 20 of the 34 member countries, and ratified by
just 13.55
53
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3. Union of South American Nations' (UNASUR)
new creation, the South American Defense
Consulate, which just recently garnered
commitments from each UNASUR member
country to share information on spending and
acquisitions. 56 Robledo sees particular promise in
UNASUR, even calling for a "U.S.-UNASUR
security dialogue." At the very least, UNASUR
should be supported, he says, because "If
successful, [it] may address [the] most critical
sub-regional security issues, even concerns about
Venezuela."57
Countries may wish to streamline these diverse transparency
systems, but most important is that they continue to
participate and effectuate systems of openness, active
communication, and accountability. 58 While "participating
in [transparency mechanisms] means yielding some secrecy,
yielding some sovereignty," concedes Mr. Isacson, "the
payoff for all of those involved is probably greater." 59
Finally, the United States can do its part by conscientiously
supporting Latin American countries that take on the
process. Ideally, this will allow the United States to make
manifest the broad "equal partners" approach described by
President Obama at the Sununit of the Americas in Trinidad
(April2009), and by Mr. Mora days later. As Mr. Mora then
explained, current U.S. engagement and commitment with
Latin America should be judged "by how successful the U.S.
1s m partnering with regional neighbors to build their
56
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expertise and competence to provide for their own security
and the security of the region as a whole." 60 Supporting the
maturation of Latin America's transparency mechanisms is a
specific opportunity for enacting this approach today.
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APPENDIX I

Military Expenditure of Latin America's Six Biggest Spenders (1988- 2009)
Conventlon: US$ m. = Million US dollars; = Data not available or not applicable, () =Uncertain figure. ll = S!PRl estimate.
th. = thoosand; m. =million; b.= billion. Figures in l:OOB1ant US do1lam and as a ihaie ofGDP are presented by calmda:ryem.

In constant ( 2008 ) US$ m.
Brazil
N

v.

y"'
Vol~

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1M

1997

1991

1999

2000

2001

2000

2000

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

r17,855] U7,673] [12,161] [7,185] [7,450] [10,7991 [12,762]17,747 16,504 16,391 17,618 18,049 19,550 22,531 22,947 18,306 19,021 20,581 21,310 22,983 23,302 27,124

Chilo
Year
Value

1988
[2,7:56]

1989
199(1
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 21106 2007 2008 2009
[2,442] [2,50!1] [2,585] [2,676] [2,742] [2,773] [2,841] [2,948] [3,209] 3,420 3,623 3,835 3,981 4,246 4,310 4,998 5,364 6,282 6,116 5,982 5,6113

Nota: (I) The ligures fur Chile include direct tmnsfm from the rts.te-owned. copper oompany Cmporaci6n Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) fur milit:ary purchases. These transfers incmlsed rapidly
between 2005 and 2008 owing to rising copper prices, than fell in 2009, also al.ang wilh copper priooo. (2) Figures ftt these COIIliiries are fur 1he adopted budget. rather 1han actual expmllinre

Colombia
Year
Value

1988
1989
1!190
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996 1997 1993 1999 2000 1001 2001 2003 1004 2005 2006 1007 2008 2009
[2,293] [2,562] [2,633] [2,237] [2,714] [3,288] [3,143] [3,560] [4,150] 4,731 3,671 3,777 4,766 5,259 5,588 6,.511 6,419 6,643 7,533 7,742 9,076 10,055

Note: The figures fur Colombia in 2002-2007 illclude special allocations totaling 25 billim peso:& from a war tax decree of12 August 2002, M03t ofthe.~e aUocatiOllll w;;:re ~JXIlt hdweoo 2002-lOO•t

Ecuador
Year

1938

1989

199D

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

-

mu•m•mm~~mrnm~•~rnmrn~-~--

1998

1999

lDOO

2:001

2002

lfl03

2:004

2005

2006

lfl07

Note: Ecuador changed its cwrem.-y fran the sucre to the US dollan: on 13 Man:b 2000, at &. rete of one doll.ur to 25 000 &UCICII. The current price figuml fur each year repmnmt the
dollm: w1ue of military expenditure at the m.arket exchange rate for that year.

2DD8

21109

y..,.

1988

Vol"'

[584]

y..,

.... ....

l636]

l611J

1988 1989 1990

VoiDe

Uruguay
1991
[471J

1092
[626]

,..,

1993
[487]

1...
l720]

,...

1995

1996

[441]

[422]

1997 1998
[417] [4ll6J

,...

....

l420]

2000

2001

2002

2003

[352J

404

350

336

,...

Venezuela

- - ....
--326

2005
337

343

2007 2008 2009
351
401
496

1991
1993
1995
1997
1999 21100 2001 2002 2003
2005
2007
[3,217] [2,973] [3,709] 2,720 2,613 1,887 3,095 2,405 2,089 2,563 2.591 1,903 1,853 2,627 3,548 4,681 3,908 4,329 3,254

N*-: (1) The figure forVmm:u::la fur 2009 is fur the initial budget. In recent years, V;mezuela's actual military spending hu been eorOOstently and signifu:antlyhigherthan 1he initial budget,. by44%
in 2006. 15% in 2007 amd 30% in 2008. Figure~ for Venezuela fur 1he yearsl99l-l997 and fur 1he m011t recent year, are for the adupted budget rather than fur the ac1ual expenditure. The figureB fur

Veoozu.ela do not include suOOtmrtial extm.mbudgetary expenditure ;;m B.rnlll import~~. (2) Thill country cbs.nged or redenonrinated it:n cummcy during the p«i.od; aU current price lor.al Clll'lmcy figures have
bcm oonverted to the latest &.."U!£ellcy.

As percentage of gross domestic product

"'"'

Brazil
Year

Value

1988 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
[2.1] [2.6] [1.9] [1.2] [1.2] [1.6] [1.6] 1.9
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.8
2
1.9
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5 1.5 1.5

Clille
Year

Value

19l!ll 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
[5] [4.2] [4.3] [3.9] [3.7] [3.6] [3.3] [3.1] [3.1] [3.2] 3.4
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.8
3.6
3.7
3.6
3.7 3.4 3.5

Colombia
Year

Value

1988 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 1001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1007 2008
[2.4] [2.6] [2.2] [l.B] [2.2] [2.5] [2.3] [2.5] [3]
3.3
2.6 2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.7
3.4
3.3
3.4 3.3 3.7

Ecuador
Year

Value

1988 1989 19!10 1991 1992 19!13 1994 19'15 1996 1997 1998 1999 21100 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.8
1.6 2.4
2
2.1
2.4
l.8
1.7
1.8
2
2.6 2.2
2.6
2.3
2.9 2.8

Year
Value

Year
Value

Uruguay

Source: SIPRI military expenditure database, <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database>, accessed
October 22nd, 2010

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
..
..
..
[1.8] [1.6] [2.1] 1.6
1.5
1
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.6 1.3 1.4

Venezuela

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
[2.6] [2.9] [2.9] [2.1] [2.8] [2.2] [3.2] [2] [1.8] [1.7] [1.6] [1.8] [1.5] 1.8
1.7
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.3 1.3 1.3

APPENDIX II
Major Conventional Arms Suppliers to Latin America's Si:< Biggest
Spenders (2000 - 2009)

Figures are SlPRI Trend Indicator Valuw (TIVs) expres~~ed in US$ m.II!COlllltlmt (1990)prices. For more informaticn, see

http:liwww.sipri.org/contexrtafarmstrad/output_types_TIV.htm1

Recipient

!

Suppliers

i

Brazil

France (673), USA (329), Sweden (175), Germany (174), Italy and Spain
(156 each)

Chile

i

Netherlands (1021), UK (667), Germany (422), USA (396), France (320)

i

Colombia

!

USA (795), Spain (113), Russia (103), Israel (90), Bmzil (60)

I

Ecuador

1

urug;;;;y

f

Venezuela

!

Chile (135), Spain (33), Israel (32), India (22), Venezuela (17)

'

i'Ortlig&i(63),oem;a;;ya;;;rspiili1(29);R:;;;si;;(6);s;.;;eli•n:<s>.canadl1(4) I
Russia (1996), China (122), Netherlands (72),1srael (51), South Korea (45)

Source: SJPRI Arms Transfers Database
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